Trust arrives as signed payloads
Each certificate is self-signed; trust flows through the payloads the ceremony builds.
| The firmware trusts |
Because |
| The Platform Key |
An operator enrolled it. |
| The Key Exchange Key |
The Platform Key signed its payload. |
| Our signing certificate |
The Key Exchange Key signed the signature database's payload. |
Vendor certificates stay
The firmware checks option ROMs against the same database, and vendors sign a GPU's or a BMC's pre-boot code
through Microsoft's UEFI CA. So the database holds the Microsoft and Windows CAs, both generations, beside ours.
A fork keeps the CAs its hardware needs, or add-in card firmware stops loading.
Modules and images
With no shim, a module signer reaches the kernel through Fedora's platform keyring fallback (D29); sealed boot asserts it by Subject Key Identifier.
containers/image cannot verify GitLab's keyless identities at pull time
(the evidence lane's record),
so images are signed with our own cosign key, with no transparency log.